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A Familial Privacy Right Over Death Images:
Critiquing the Internet-Propelled Emergence
of a Nascent Constitutional Right that
Preserves Happy Memories and Emotions
by CLAY CALVERT*
Introduction
In May 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit broke new constitutional ground in Marsh v. County of San
Diego' when it became the first court at any level' to hold that a
federal right to privacy, rooted in the word "liberty" within the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' encompasses "the
power to control images of a dead family member."4  Writing for a
unanimous three-judge panel, Alex Kozinski, the Ninth Circuit's
iconoclastic' chief judge, concluded that a mother "has a
* Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and director of
the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida,
Gainesville, Fla.; B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the
Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The author
thanks Calli Breil, Ann Manov, Krystal McKay, Cassie Mestre and Linda Riedemann of
the University for Florida for their review and comments on early drafts of this article.
1. See Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. See id. at 1154 ("So far as we are aware, then, this is the first case to consider
whether the common law right to non-interference with a family's remembrance of a
decedent is so ingrained in our traditions that it is constitutionally protected. We conclude
that it is."). See also id. at 1159 ("[T]his is the first case to address the federal privacy
interest in death images.").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
4. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1153.
5. See Carl Tobias, A New No. 1 at the 9th Circuit, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/opinion/oe-tobias3O ("Kozinski ...
enjoys a well-deserved reputation as an iconoclast or, some would say, eccentric."). See
also Kozinski Wins Seat on U.S. Appeals Court in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 1985, at 10
("Senate confirmed a controversial nominee, Alex Kozinski, to the U.S. Court of Appeals
[475]
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constitutionally protected right to privacy over her child's death
images."' In Marsh, those images were autopsy photos of a toddler7
who died of severe head trauma8 that one lower court previously
described as "gory"9 and "gruesome.""o
That Judge Kozinski was among the initial trio of jurists-the
other members of the Marsh panel were Kim McLane Wardlaw and
Richard Paez"-to recognize this right is probably unsurprising. As
Judge Kozinski proclaimed one decade before Marsh, "I consider
myself a fan of all rights. We are here to protect the people from
intrusive government in all of the things that people do in all their
lives."I2
His embracement of a new niche of privacy, however, directly
conflicts with an earlier decision in Marsh by U.S. District Judge Janis
Sammartino." In February 2011, Sammartino concluded, upon the
same facts, that the federal constitutional right to privacy "does not
encompass a relative's interest in a decedent's autopsy photos. As
crass as it may seem, Plaintiff's interest in the autopsy photos does
not fall within the class of most basic decisions about family,
parenthood, or bodily integrity."l 4
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Marsh, which outlines
the identical right that Judge Sammartino denied, may constitute a
natural, if not inevitable, constitutional culmination of a recent
in San Francisco yesterday. Kozinski, 35, will become the youngest federal appellate judge
in the nation. For the past three years, he has been chief judge of the U.S. Claims Court in
Washington, D.C.").
6. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1160.
7. See generally Nancy L. McElwain, Toddlerhood, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 1272 (Neil J. Salkind ed., 2005) (describing toddlerhood as typically
beginning around a child's first birthday and extending until to the end of the third year,
and providing further background on the phase of toddlerhood). As described later, the
deceased child in Marsh was a two-year-old boy, thus falling within the toddler
classification. Infra note 34. See also Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152 ("In 1983, Brenda Marsh's
two-year-old son, Phillip Buell, died from a severe head injury .... ) (emphasis added).
8. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
9. People v. Marsh, 221 Cal. Rptr. 311, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
10. Id.
11. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
12. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Defending the First in the Ninth: Judge Alex
Kozinski and the Freedoms of Speech and Press, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 259, 270
(2003).
13. See Marsh v. County of San Diego, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (S.D. Cal. 2011).
14. Id. at 1231.
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"growth in privacy-of-death jurisprudence."" It is a jurisprudence
that, after Marsh, now cuts across the domains of constitutional,
statutory and common law, while taking into account "concerns for
the family's privacy rights, emotional tranquility, solemn respect, and
dignity.""
Using the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Marsh as an analytical
springboard, this article concentrates on four facets of this nascent
niche of the federal constitutional right to privacy:
1. How both lower-court and legislative recognition of the
Internet as a powerful privacy-destroying force, when coupled with
Justice Anthony Kennedy's 2004 opinion for a unanimous Supreme
Court in National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish,"
rapidly expedited the transformation of a common law right that had
unhurriedly germinated for more than eighty years into a budding
constitutional one;
2. How the familial privacy right over death-scene and autopsy
images is fundamentally different from-at least, in its protection of
the intangible interests of both emotional tranquility and memory
preservation-most constitutional privacy interests that affect actions
and autonomous decision-making. Marsh, in brief, significantly
expands the range of interests shielded from government interference
and exploitation by the federal constitutional right to privacy;
3. How Marsh might be construed as recognizing a specific sliver
of a broader constitutional right to informational privacy to which the
Supreme Court, back in 1977 in Whalen v. Roe," has alluded." The
possibility of such a right is tenuous, however, as the Court in 2011 in
NASA v. Nelsono merely assumed it existed without directly deciding
its viability,2 1 and two justices in Nelson completely rejected its
existence. In particular, Justice Antonin Scalia bluntly wrote in a
15. Clay Calvert, The Privacy of Death: An Emergent Jurisprudence and Legal
Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133,
135 (2006).
16. Calvert, The Privacy of Death, supra note 15, at 135.
17. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
18. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
19. Id. at 599-600.
20. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin.v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) [hereinafter
Nelson Ill].
21. Id. at 751 ("We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy
right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.").
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concurrence joined by Justice Clarence Thomas that "[a] federal
constitutional right to 'informational privacy' does not exist;"" and,
4. How the newfound constitutional right to familial privacy over
death images potentially conflicts with the twin First Amendment"
interests of free speech and press that may militate in favor of
publishing such images, particularly when they are newsworthy or of
public concern.
To start to address these issues, Part I of the article provides an
overview of Marsh, focusing on Judge Kozinski's reasoning and
analysis in finding a new feature of the unenumerated constitutional
right to privacy.25 Part II then demonstrates how Justice Kennedy's
dicta-rich description in Favish of the cultural and common law rights
of familial privacy over death images tilled the judicial soil in which
Marsh's recognition of such a constitutional right took root 26 Next,
Part III explores both judicial and legislative recognition, across
multiple cases and controversies during the past fifteen years
involving death-scene and/or autopsy images, of the Internet's power
as a game-changing force in the battle to preserve privacy.27 Part IV
then illustrates how these twin forces-Favish and the Internet-
produced in Marsh a constitutional privacy right that protects
interests seemingly far different from those involved in using and
receiving information about contraception,8 choosing whether to
22. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
23. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." U.S. CONST. amend. . The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were
incorporated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and
officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666 (1925).
24. See generally Clay Calvert, Defining "Public Concern" After Snyder v. Phelps: A
Pliable Standard Mingles With News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39
(2012) (providing an overview of the concepts of public concern and newsworthiness in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Westboro Baptist Church funeral-protest
case of Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)).
25. See infra notes 36-110 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 111-144 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 145-202 and accompanying text.
28. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) ("[T]he right of privacy
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one. The present case, then, concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."). See also Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The
Political Question Doctrine as a Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 169, 181 (2006) ("The first case in which the Court recognized a constitutional right
to privacy-Griswold v. Connecticut-involved state regulation of the sale and distribution
of contraceptives.").
478 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:3
Spring 2013] FAMILIAL PRIVACY RIGHT AND DEATH IMAGES
have an abortion," and engaging in consensual homosexual acts in
private settingso recognized in other cases." Part V briefly analyzes
what the familial privacy right recognized in Marsh over death images
might portend for a broader, yet still not explicitly recognized,
constitutional right to informational privacy dodged by the Court in
2011 in Nelson.
Next, Part VI explores the tension between the constitutional
right to privacy over images of death and the First Amendment
interest in the free expression of newsworthy information." Finally,
Part VII brings these diverse strands together and calls on the U.S.
Supreme Court to affirm, if given the opportunity, the familial privacy
right to control death images as embraced by the Ninth Circuit in
Marsh, but to leave an exemption for newsworthy images that reflect
on the conduct of government officials and/or operations.' A
qualified right, rather than an absolute one, would strike a balance
between familial interests and potential intangible injury to memories
and emotions, and the public's right to know important information.
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action... or... in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.").
30. In opining against Texas' anti-sodomy statute in 2003, Justice Anthony Kennedy
emphasized privacy concerns, reasoning for the majority that:
[t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government.... The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (emphasis added).
31. See infra notes 203-29 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 230-69 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 270-98 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 299-310 and accompanying text.
35. The right to know constitutes an unenumerated or peripheral First Amendment
interest. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right to
know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, political
and other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to freedom
of expression and freedom of the press. Without those contacts First Amendment rights
suffer."). See generally Eric B. Easton, Annotating the News: Mitigating the Effects of
Media Convergence and Consolidation, 23 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L. REV. 143, 155-61
(2000) (providing background on the First Amendment right to know).
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I. Marsh v. County of San Diego: Facts, Issues and
the Ninth Circuit's Analysis
This part features two sections. First, Section A articulates the
factual framework in Marsh, providing details and context for the
case. Section B then provides an overview of the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the crucial substantive due process question raised by
plaintiff Brenda Marsh: whether she possessed a federal
constitutional privacy right to control dissemination of her son's
autopsy photos.
A. Sparks Igniting a New Constitutional Right: A Boy's Tragic Death
and the Release of an Autopsy Photo
When two-year-old Phillip Buell died on April 28, 1983, the
Supreme Court's pivotal privacy-grounded abortion decision of Roe
v. Wade" was a mere decade old. Furthermore, the high court's
ruling in Lawrence v. Texas' striking down a Texas anti-sodomy
statute and upholding the right of consenting adults, including
homosexuals, to engage in the private, noninjurious sexual conduct of
their choosing,'9 was still twenty years in the future.40
It would therefore have been difficult in 1983 to predict that
Phillip's death and the public release decades later of one of his
autopsy photos by Jay Coulter 4 1-a retired prosecutor apparently
peeved that the man he helped to convict of Phillip's murder,
36. Mark Martin, $756,900 for 21 Years Wrongly Held in Prison; Dead Child's Mom
Always Said Convict Didn't Kill Her Son, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/756-900-for-21-years-wrongly-held-in-prison-2506317.
php.
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39. See id. at 578 (emphasizing that the case did not involve minors or individuals
"who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent
might not easily be refused").
40. See supra note 30 (providing a key portion of the majority's ruling in Lawrence
emphasizing the privacy aspects of its reasoning).
41. Coulter released the photograph to two news media outlets in 2006, six years
after he retired. See Brief for Appellees at 7, Marsh v. County of San Diego (9th Cir. Aug.
1, 2011) (No. 11-55395) (hereinafter Appellees' Brief), available at http://www.law.uci.edu/
calendar/11-55395 ans.pdf (stating that "[s]ix years after retirement, Coulter copied this
photograph into a memorandum he prepared as a private citizen, entitled 'What Really
Happened to Phillip Buell,"' and adding that Coulter "prepared the memorandum
because he had been contacted by the media to answer questions about Phillip's death").
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Kenneth Marsh,"4  was set free"-would spawn a new facet of
constitutional privacy.4 Indeed, it was Coulter's alleged attempt to
have news organizations publish an autopsy photo45 that the Ninth
Circuit deemed "sufficiently shocking to violate [plaintiff Brenda]
Marsh's substantive due process right."'
Such are the tortured factual underpinnings and the trio of
protagonists at the heart of Marsh v. County of San Diego: Plaintiff
Brenda Marsh, the grief-stricken mother of Phillip Buell and the
woman who now finds her name on a groundbreaking decision,
Kenneth Marsh, the man wrongfully convicted of murdering Phillip
Buell, and Jay Coulter, a former prosecutor who tried Kenneth Marsh
and admitted to both copying and taking home sixteen of Phillip's
42. See Marsh v. County of San Diego, 771 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1229 (S.D. Cal. 2011)
(describing Coulter as "the San Diego Deputy District Attorney who tried Mr. Marsh's
criminal prosecution").
43. See generally Maura Dolan, State Pays Wrongly Convicted Man; Compensation
Board Awards Kenneth M. Marsh $756,900, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at B1 (reporting
that Jay Coulter, the retired deputy district attorney who prosecuted Kenneth Marsh,
"remains unconvinced that Marsh is innocent" and that "Coulter said the evidence did not
fit Marsh's version of what happened"); Wrongly Jailed, Ex-Inmate Receives a $757,000
Award, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, at A14 (reporting that Kenneth Marsh "spent nearly 21
years in prison" after being convicted of second-degree murder in the death of Phillip
Buell).
44. According to a brief filed by Brenda Marsh, mother of the deceased Phillip Buell,
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Deputy District Attorney Jay S. Coulter:
disagreed with the setting aside of the conviction he obtained of
Kenneth Marsh in 1983, and objected to the publicity given to Marsh
upon his release from prison and subsequent successful Penal Code
4900 proceeding. COULTER began insisting to anyone who would
listen that Kenneth Marsh was guilty ... He contacted news reporters,
prosecutors, legislators, attorneys and physicians, attempting to state
his opinion that Kenneth Marsh was guilty.
Brief of Appellant at 5-6, Marsh v. County of San Diego (9th Cir. June 20, 2011) (No. 11-
55395) (hereinafter Brief of Appellant), available at http://www.law.uci.edu/calendar/11-
55395_opn.pdf.
45. Coulter asserted that "he did not want to comment on the murder trial based on
'30 year old memories' so he prepared statements to provide to the media, including the
2006 memorandum, and he provided that memorandum to two reporters." Appellees'
Brief, supra note 41, at 8. Rather than seek out the reporters, Coulter contended that he
"prepared the memorandum because he had been contacted by the media to answer
questions about Phillip's death" after Kenneth Marsh married Phillip's mother, Brenda
Marsh. Id. at 7.
46. Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012).
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autopsy photos" and later releasing one of them-post-retirement-
to two news media organizations."
At the time of Phillip's death, Kenneth Marsh was Brenda's live-
in boyfriend.4 9 The two later married despite the government's
accusation that Kenneth killed Brenda's son.o It was during the
discovery phase of a lawsuit Kenneth Marsh filed against Coulter and
San Diego County after his release from prison" that, as the Ninth
Circuit wrote:
Coulter disclosed that, while he was Deputy
District Attorney, he photocopied sixteen autopsy
photographs of Phillip's corpse. Coulter also
mentioned that, after he retired, he kept one of these
as a "memento of cases that [he] handled." Coulter
eventually gave a copy of this photograph, along with
a memorandum he wrote titled "What Really
Happened to Phillip Buell?," to a newspaper and a
*52television station.
47. Brief of Appellant, supra note 44, at 5 (alleging that "COULTER also admitted
in his deposition testimony that after his retirement in 2000, he took home those sixteen
(16) copies of Phillip Buell's autopsy photographs").
48. According to Brenda Marsh, Coulter
admitted that he drafted a memorandum entitled "What Really
Happened to Phillip Buell" in which he copied to, and included, one of
the autopsy photographs taken of Phillip during his 1983 autopsy ....
To "prove" Kenneth Marsh's guilt, COULTER admitted that he
provided at least one of the autopsy photographs to Thom Jensen of
KGTV television in San Diego, and to Maura Dolan of the Los
Angeles Times, as part of that memorandum.
Id. at 6.
49. See id. at 2 (describing Kenneth Marsh as Brenda Marsh's "then boyfriend").
50. Id. (describing Kenneth Marsh as Brenda Marsh's "now husband").
51. See Marsh v. County of San Diego, 2007 WL 3023478, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15,
2007) (involving a motion to compel the production of certain medical records in Kenneth
Marsh's lawsuit claiming violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, malicious prosecution,
intentional infliction of emotional distress and violation of California state civil rights
statutes, and noting that Kenneth Marsh alleged there was "a conspiracy between
Defendants to mislead and distort the medical history of Phillip Buell and to perform his
autopsy in a false and deliberate manner to convict" Marsh, and that "the Defendants
improperly influenced the County of San Diego to allow them to perform autopsies and
autopsy related services in cases where children's deaths were suspected of having been
caused by abuse").
52. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
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The news organizations ultimately chose not to publish the
photograph13 and, as Coulter emphasized in a brief filed with the
Ninth Circuit, Brenda Marsh "did not see the photograph in any
media coverage, or hear about it from family or friends.",4
Nonetheless, Brenda Marsh sued Coulter and San Diego County,
alleging that the copying and dissemination of her late son's autopsy
photographs violated her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights" and, in particular, "a federal right to control the autopsy
photographs of her child."5 6
Why did she sue? According to a brief filed on her behalf with
the Ninth Circuit, Brenda Marsh was horrified when she learned of
Coulter's copying and disclosure of her late son's autopsy photos and
she "suffered severe emotional distress, fearing the day that she
would go on the Internet and find her son's hideous autopsy
photos.""
This allegation regarding the speculative harm she might
someday sustain due to possible posting of the images on the Internet
ultimately proved pivotal for the Ninth Circuit. As Judge Kozinski
opined, "Marsh's fear is not unreasonable given the viral nature of
the Internet, where she might easily stumble upon photographs of her
dead son on news websites, blogs or social media websites.",8 As Part
II later explores, Judge Kozinski's reasoning here aligns with other
courts, legislative bodies and scholars concerned about the
deleterious impact of the Internet on image-based privacy rights. As
Professor Danielle Keats Citron encapsulates it:
[t]he searchable, permanent nature of the Internet
extends the life and audience of privacy disclosures,
and exacerbates individuals' emotional and
reputational injuries. For instance, if pictures and
videos of a young girl's sexual abuse are posted online,
53. See Bob Egelko, Family May Keep Autopsy Photos Private, Court Says, S.F.
CHRON., May 30, 2012, at C2 (reporting that "the media outlets did not publish the
photos").
54. Appellees' Brief, supra note 41, at 1.
55. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
56. Id. at 1152-53.
57. Brief of Appellant, supra note 44, at 6-7.
58. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1155.
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they may remain there indefinitely, ensuring that the
victim remains haunted by the abuse as an adult. 9
What was different about Judge Kozinski's reasoning, however,
was his analysis of Brenda Marsh's underlying argument-that she
possessed a federal right to control autopsy images of her son "as a
matter of substantive due process,"6a rather than as a matter of
common law or as a federal statutory right. The next section thus
analyzes the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the substantive due process
issue.
B. Substantive Due Process: Finding a New Facet of a Fundamental
Privacy Right
When examining Marsh, it is initially important to note that by
focusing on substantive due process, the Ninth Circuit parted ways
from the Supreme Court's groundbreaking constitutional privacy
rights analysis in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 1  In Griswold, "the
Supreme Court for the first time expressly established the right to
privacy as a constitutional matter." 2  But as Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky observes, Justice William Douglas's majority opinion in
Griswold "began by rejecting substantive due process as a basis for
finding a right to privacy in the Constitution. Instead, Justice
Douglas said that privacy was found in the penumbras of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights."6 Specifically, Douglas characterized
the marital relationship as "lying within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."" He then
determined that a law forbidding the use of contraception by a
marital couple and "allow[ing] the police to search the sacred
59. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,
1808 (2010).
60. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1153.
61. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1557 (1994).
63. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
2008, 2015 (2002). See Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due
Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 115, 165 (2010) (observing that in Griswold, "the
Justices were keen to avoid the specter of 'substantive due process,"' and thus, they
"employed a confusing language of 'emanations' and 'penumbras' that has invited ridicule
ever since").
64. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. The right to privacy, according to Justice Douglas, fell
within the penumbras and emanations of multiple amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. at 484.
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precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives"" was "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship.""
The fact that the Ninth Circuit would utilize substantive due
process to articulate a new niche of constitutional rights renders
Marsh a decision ripe for immediate critique. As Professor Daniel
Conkle writes, "[n]othing in constitutional law is more controversial
than substantive due process.", 7  Conkle is not alone in that
sentiment.' Indeed, as Professor Kermit Roosevelt adds, the "very
idea of substantive due process has been derided as oxymoronic, most
famously by John Hart Ely, who likened it to 'green pastel redness.' ,69
Justice Antonin Scalia recently blasted substantive due process in the
context of informational privacy, referring to it as an "infinitely
plastic concept",o that allows the Court "to invent a constitutional
right out of whole cloth.""
Compounding the problem inherent with a substantive due
process analysis is the very notion of privacy itself, which Professor
Jerry Kang calls "a chameleon that shifts meaning depending on
context."7 2  Other scholars are in accord. For instance, Professor
Daniel Solove observes that "[tjime and again philosophers, legal
theorists, and jurists have lamented the great difficulty in reaching a
satisfying conception of privacy."3 It is a sentiment seconded by
65. Id. at 485.
66. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
67. Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 64 (2006).
68. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 859, 859 (2009) (describing "the highly controversial area of so-called
substantive due process"); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND.
L.J. 1, 2 (1994) (contending that "any form of substantive due process has controversial
foundations as a matter of text and history"); John C. Toro, The Charade of Tradition-
Based Substantive Due Process, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 172, 173-74 (2009) (asserting
that "[sJubstantive due process is the most controversial doctrine in constitutional law.
Critics argue that when judges strike down legislation on substantive due process grounds,
they improperly impose their own moral-political judgments without license from either
the text of the Constitution or its original understanding").
69. Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 984 (2006) (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DIsTRUST 18 (1980)).
70. Nelson III, 131 S. Ct. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1202 (1998).
73. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2002).
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Professor Patricia Sanchez Abril who asserts that "[p]rivacy is a very
complex and nuanced concept. Luminaries across academic
disciplines have tried to define its precise meaning and importance,
yet no singular definition has emerged."74
While Solove writes that two traditional conceptions of privacy
involve limiting access to oneself' and controlling personal
information,7 6 the right at issue in Marsh arguably differs from these
notions because it involves: 1. limiting access to images of others
(specifically, deceased relatives) rather than images of oneself; and 2.
controlling information about others (specifically, deceased relatives)
rather than information relating to themselves and their own identity.
Furthermore, the privacy interests at stake in Marsh do not
involve so-called personally identifiable information ("P11"), which is
"one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation"77 despite
being highly contested and poorly defined.7" No data or facts personal
to the identity of any living person, such as a social security number,
mailing address, driver's license number or phone number that
74. Patricia Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 695 (2010).
75. Solove, supra note 73, at 1102-05 (addressing privacy conceived as limited access
to the self).
76. Id. at 1109-15 (addressing privacy conceived as control over personal
information).
77. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PH Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1814, 1816 (2011). See
generally Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal
Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 91, 93 (2009) (providing an overview of personally identifying information (PII),
and observing that PII is "essentially, data that identifies a particular individual. Some
pieces of PII-such as Social Security numbers-identify by themselves, while other
pieces-such as a maiden name or employment address-only identify individuals when
aggregated together into a digital profile").
78. The Federal Trade Commission observed in a 2012 report that there is "a general
acknowledgment that the traditional distinction between PII and non-PII has blurred and
that it is appropriate to more comprehensively examine data to determine the data's
privacy implications." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICY MAKERS 19 (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1776 (2010) (calling PII a "hopelessly flawed
crutch" for regulators like the Federal Trade Commission to rely upon in protecting
privacy); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 1, 7
(2011) (asserting that PII "is not limited to information that directly identifies a subject.
Included in its ambit are pieces of information that can be used in combination to
indirectly link sensitive information to a particular person").
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traditionally were thought of as PII, were at stake in Marsh.9 The
case, in other words, was not about behavioral marketing, online
tracking or other concerns regarding Internet-based collection of
personal data"o for possible nefarious purposes that animate so much
of today's academic discussion about privacy."
What is ultimately at stake in Marsh is information about
others-specifically, information in the form of photographic images
of deceased persons, as opposed to information about them in the
appearance of words, home addresses, social security numbers or IP
addresses. Further resting in the balance with the brand of privacy
recognized in Marsh are the memories, emotions and tranquility of
the living that may be adversely and irreparably affected by the
disclosure of images on the Internet. What Marsh thus shares in
common with the concerns of scholars who devote their efforts to
online informational privacy is the driving force of what Professor
Jeffrey Rosen calls "the Web [that] never forgets."n In brief, just as
the Internet is a transformative technology in the collection and
aggregation of facts and figures about individuals that might
jeopardize their privacy, so too is it a terrain-shifting variable in
judicial and legislative recognition of privacy interests surrounding
publication of death images,' as Part II explains.
To establish this newfound constitutional privacy right under a
substantive due process analysis, Judge Kozinski began by observing
that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the word "liberty"
79. See Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 899, 910 (2011) (noting that information such as "as a name, postal
address, Social Security Number, or driver's license number" falls within traditional
conceptions of P11).
80. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Information Privacy: Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46
GA. L. REV. 657 (2012) (serving as a thoughtful example of a law journal article
addressing the disclosure of personal information online and proposing a solution for
protecting online privacy).
81. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What is to be Done?, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 929 (2012) (analyzing the problems wrought by the so-called privacy
merchants--corporations that collect and sell information about Internet users and
monitor their online activities); Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure,
Unfairness and Externalities, 6 ISJLPI/S: J.L. & Pol'y for Info. Soc'y 425, 426 (2011)
(observing that "[p]rivacy policy is back. Policymakers and the public are again concerned
about the collection of personal information by businesses and its possible misuse").
82. Jeffrey Rosen, Information Privacy: Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web that Never
Forgets, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 345, 345 (2011).
83. Cf Citron, supra note 59, at 1851 (noting the "Internet's magnifying and
distorting impact in assessing" privacy claims based upon public disclosure of private
facts).
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in the Due Process Clause protects two types of privacy interests: 1.
Informational Control: avoiding disclosure of information about
certain personal matters;8 and 2. Familial Integrity and Decisional
Autonomy: making independent choices and decisions related to and
affecting certain familial matters."
Rather than rely solely on one of these two "divergent
interests"86 of privacy, Judge Kozinski and his colleagues deployed
both aspects to pinpoint the loci of the familial right to control death
images.87 The blending and fusion of an informational-control right
with a familial-integrity right produces a familial right to control
information in the form of death images.
Regarding informational control and avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, Judge Kozinski emphasized that public
dissemination of vivid photographic information can disrupt private
grieving:
Few things are more personal than the graphic
details of a close family member's tragic death.
Images of the body usually reveal a great deal about
the manner of death and the decedent's suffering
during his final moments-all matters of private grief
not generally shared with the world at large.'
84. Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)).
85. See id at 1154 (reasoning that "a parent's right to control a deceased child's
remains and death images flows from the well-established substantive due process right to
family integrity") (emphasis added). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 798 (3d ed. 2006) (observing that
"the Court has expressly held that certain aspects of family autonomy are fundamental
rights and that government interference with them will be allowed only if strict scrutiny is
met," and adding that these specific familial liberty rights include "the right to marry, the
right to custody of one's children, the right to keep the family together, and the right to
control the upbringing of one's children").
86. See Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial
Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1045 (2009) (observing that subsequent to
the U.S. Supreme Court's groundbreaking privacy decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "privacy has come to encompass divergent interests in both 'decisional'
privacy-the right to make certain profoundly personal decisions, such as those
concerning contraception, abortion, or marriage, free from government intrusion-and
'informational' privacy-the right to control the public disclosure of highly personal
information").
87. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (opining that "tt]he long-standing tradition of respecting
family members' privacy in death images partakes of both types of privacy interests
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment").
88. Id.
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Unpacking this brief quotation, four key words emerge that pack
a powerful rhetorical punch in favor of privacy: graphic, tragic,
suffering, and grief. Viewed collectively, this quartet of terms
captures not only the denotative nature of the cognitive information
conveyed by death images like those at stake in Marsh, but also their
emotive and affective force on the individuals who view them.
Specifically, "graphic" relates directly to the nature of the
cognitive information conveyed by the images: vivid, raw, explicit and
uncensored information about the manner of death. It is the viewing
of such information-the vicarious witnessing, as it were, of a "tragic"
death-that produces emotions of "grief"89 in family members. That
sense of familial grief itself possibly emerges from two different
sources: 1. imagining the "suffering" felt and sustained by their
deceased loved one as he or she perished; and 2. speculating about
how an unseen audience of complete strangers on the Internet is
feasting on those same images to satiate its voyeuristic appetite."
Judge Kozinski's recognition of the cognitive and emotive power
of images harkens back to the Supreme Court's analysis of the
cognitive and emotive force of words expounded upon in Cohen v.
California.1 Writing for the majority in Cohen and protecting an
adult's right to wear a jacket emblazoned with the message "Fuck the
Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse corridor, Justice John Marshall
Harlan observed "that much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of
relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force.""
In Marsh, however, it is precisely the emotive or affective power
of the images that requires their censorship rather than mandates
their publication. Chief Justice John Roberts recently observed that
89. See Margaret Stroebe & Henk Schut, The Dual Process Model of Coping with
Bereavement: Rationale and Description, 23 DEATH STUD. 197, 206 (1999) (observing that
"[b]ereavement is a life stressor eliciting grief an emotion. What needs to be coped with
above all is grief") (emphasis added).
90. See generally Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 279-80 (1999) (asserting that "[ais a
culture, we like to watch others and take pleasure from the watching experience, even
though we don't always like to admit to it," and noting that "[w]e rely on the media to
satisfy our craving for lurid and/or private peeks at others' lives and intimate moments").
91. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
92. Id. at 26.
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"[a]s every schoolchild knows, a picture is worth a thousand words."93
They are worth the proverbial thousand words because, as Professor
Rebecca Tushnet asserts in a recent Harvard Law Review article,
"[ilmages are more vivid and engaging than mere words"94 and they
"can trigger emotions more reliably than words."95  It is these
emotions-ones tied to grief, grieving and memory-that represent
the intangible injury that a constitutional right of familial privacy over
images of death guards against.
Put another way, Professor Tushnet observes that some courts in
privacy cases "treat images as more dangerous than words because
they provide more information than words could. This greater
amount of content becomes a reason to regulate photographs more
heavily than words." 6 Similarly, an article published in the Journal of
Mass Media Ethics more than two decades ago asserted that "a
powerful photograph can tell a story as no words can. Yet, because
photographs have greater impact on people than do written words,
their capacity to shock exceeds that of language."7
As applied to situations like Marsh, this logic about the sheer
power of imagery suggests that while lifeless images of Phillip Buell
can be shielded from public disclosure by a constitutional right to
privacy, words describing Phillip's death-perhaps in the form of a
written autopsy report-cannot be similarly sheltered. Thus, the
privacy right recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Marsh is one that
plays upon an images-versus-words dichotomy with Judge Kozinski
specifically using the word "images" when defining it.' There was no
suggestion by the Ninth Circuit that the written autopsy report was a
document subject to Brenda Marsh's constitutional privacy rights. It
should be noted, however, that courts have suppressed from public
release written autopsy reports even when they are presumptively
open under state freedom of information statutes."
93. FCC v. CBS Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2677, 2678 (2012).
94. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REv. 683,690 (2012).
95. Id. at 691.
96. Id. at 703.
97. Jennifer E. Brown, News Photographs and the Pornography of Grief, 2 J. MASS
MEDIA ETHICS 75, 75 (1987).
98. See supra notes 4 and 6 and accompanying text.
99. See Bodelson v. Denver Publ'g Co., 5 P.3d 373, 378 (Colo. App. 2000)
(upholding, under a provision in the Colorado Open Records Act allowing for suppression
of presumptively open records such as autopsy reports, a trial court's order restricting
public inspection and disclosure of autopsy reports resulting from the shooting incident at
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Turning to the familial integrity-and-autonomy strand of
substantive due process and privacy, the Ninth Circuit opined that:
[Al parent's right to choose how to care for a
child in life reasonably extends to decisions dealing
with death, such as whether to have an autopsy, how
to dispose of the remains, whether to have a memorial
service and whether to publish an obituary.
Therefore, we find that the Constitution protects a
parent's right to control the physical remains, memory
and images of a deceased child against unwarranted
public exploitation by the government.
The link between images and memories is rather remarkable.
Why? Because Marsh creates a constitutional right that thwarts
governmental release of disturbing death images in order to preserve
happy memories in the living. Put more explicitly, the power to
control negative images facilitates the power to preserve positive
memories. Therefore, the government (Jay Coulter and San Diego
County) must suppress negative imagery to allow positive thoughts
and recollections held by a private citizen (Brenda Marsh) to
prevail.'
Judge Kozinski telegraphed this conclusion and the importance
of memory preservation in the opening sentence of Marsh by
asserting that "we try to remember our dearly departed as they were
in life, not as they were at the end."" Although never addressed or
cited in Marsh, there is, in fact, much evidence supporting the
connection between photos and memories. As one study notes, "[ilf
memory is the way people keep telling themselves their stories, then
Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, and concluding that there was "substantial
evidence" to find "that disclosure of the autopsy reports would do substantial injury to the
public interest").
100. Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added).
101. This proposition within the realm of constitutional privacy rights would
contradict much of First Amendment free speech jurisprudence were it to be extended to
government suppression of negative ideas and beliefs in order to preserve happy thoughts
and positive beliefs. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (observing that
"[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or disagreeable").
102. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1152.
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photographs are one of the ways people keep those stories alive."', 3
Another study suggests this is especially true when it comes to the
role that photos of deceased children play for grieving parents. In
particular, Gordon Riches and Pamela Dawson assert in the journal
Death Studies that:
[P]hotographs can provide an important prop
both as an object of personal internal conversation
with the deceased and as a vehicle for conversations
between surviving relatives and others about the
deceased. Whilst the objective presence has gone,
photographs can provide continuing support for both
public and private dialogues with the character of the
deceased."
Riches and Dawson add that photographs of deceased children
can become "objects of discourse [that] help anchor parents to the
fact of their parenthood and provide continuity in their search for a
form of adjustment that makes sense of their loss."'O'
It seems intuitive that the parental discovery of a graphic death-
scene or autopsy image of a deceased child in a public sphere, such as
the Internet, intrudes on the bereavement process by placing a very
different, disturbing and discomforting mental visualization in the
mind of a parent. Indeed, if it is true that a deceased child's life can
"be carefully catalogued and ordered in photograph albums that
enable any point in the family's history to be open and relived[,]"'
then reliving a tragic death through a death-scene image never meant
for such an album is also not likely desired to be reexperienced on the
Internet as part of the family's public history.
Judge Kozinski, in fact, emphasized how the accidental or
unintendedo' discovery of a gruesome death image in the public
realm-namely, the Internet-can intrude "into the grief of a mother
103. Maryanne Garry & Matthew P. Gerrie, When Photographs Create False
Memories, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 321, 323 (2005).
104. Gordon Riches & Pamela Dawson, Lost Children, Living Memories: The Role of
Photographs in Processes of Grief and Adjustment Among Bereaved Parent, 22 DEATH
STUD. 121, 124 (1998).
105. Id. at 139.
106. Id. at 136.
107. As Judge Kozinski wrote, Brenda Marsh "might easily stumble upon
photographs of her dead son on news websites, blogs or social media websites." Marsh,
680 F.3d at 1155.
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over her dead son"'" and, by implication, the memory of her child as
he was in life. Grieving and remembering thus blend together at this
stage in the Ninth Circuit's constitutional analysis.
Although never made explicit in Marsh, there arguably are two
sets of memories of the deceased at stake: 1. familial memories, and 2.
public memories.
In particular, suppressing images of lifeless loved ones represents
not simply an effort to preserve familial memories of relatives "as
they were in life,"'" but also to prevent the development of public
memories of relatives as they were in death. Under this logic, a
family's memory of a child as she lived should not be eclipsed by the
public's memory of a child as she died. In other words, a family
presumably will always hold and cherish at least some positive
memories of a deceased loved one as he or she was in life, even after
a horrific death. Preventing an image of death from becoming etched
into the collective memory of the general public adds another layer to
the familial integrity and autonomy interests at stake under this
nascent constitutional right.
With this background in Marsh on the fusion of two strands of
substantive due process privacy-informational control, and familial
integrity and autonomy-in mind, the next part of the article
demonstrates how the Supreme Court's 2004 opinion in National
Archives and Records Administration v. Favish"o laid much of the
groundwork for the Ninth Circuit in Marsh to transform common law
and statutory recognition of familial privacy interests over death
images into a constitutional right.
II. More than Just a FOIA Case? Favish's Jurisprudential
Jumpstart of a Constitutional Right
In a 2005 law journal article, I asserted that the Supreme Court's
2004 opinion in National Archives and Records Administration v.
Favish "gave the green light to judges across the country to recognize
family members' privacy rights over the images of their dead loved
ones beyond the narrow confines of FOIA access disputes."' In
2012, the Ninth Circuit in Marsh hit the judicial accelerator and used
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1152.
110. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
111. Calvert, The Privacy of Death, supra note 15, at 136.
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Favish to drive forward a common law and statutory right into
newfound constitutional territory.
Favish played a particularly important role in Marsh not only
because the Supreme Court came close to recognizing a constitutional
right to control images of a dead family member,"' but also because
the Court provided an extended discussion of a long-standing
traditional and common law right in this area."' Acknowledging the
prior existence of a common law right was pivotal because, as Judge
Kozinski wrote, "[a] common law right rises to the level of a
constitutional right if it is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' 4  This
history-and-tradition approach for identifying fundamental rights, as
Professor Lee Goldman writes, is one generally favored by "[tihe
more conservative Justices.""' That Judge Kozinski would follow this
tack makes intuitive sense; various legal commentators have dubbed
him as "a conservative Reagan appointee,"" 6 "a rather conservative
judge,""7  and the Ninth Circuit's "most well-known
'conservative[.]."'"
Favish centered on the efforts of California attorney Allan
Favish to obtain under the federal Freedom of Information Act"9
death-scene images of Vincent Foster, Jr., the deputy counsel to then-
President Bill Clinton. Foster was found shot dead near Washington,
112. See Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1153 (writing that "[n]o court has yet held that this right
encompasses the power to control images of a dead family member, but the Supreme
Court has come close in a case involving the Freedom of Information Act").
113. Id. at 1153-54.
114. Id. at 1154 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
115. Lee Goldman, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 84 DENVER U. L. REV. 601,
602 (2004). Goldman adds that "[t]he Supreme Court Justices have adopted two, often
conflicting, approaches to determine whether a case involves a fundamental right. The
more liberal Justices, seeking to protect minority interests, ask whether a right is central to
personal dignity and autonomy or is at the heart of liberty." Id.
116. Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in
This Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 523, 548 (1996).
117. Jennifer L. Levi, Some Modest Proposals for Challenging Established Dress Code
Jurisprudence, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 243, 247 (2007) (referencing DAPHNE
SCHOLINSKY THE LAST TIME I WORE A DRESS (1997)).
118. Jennifer E. Spreng, Proposed Ninth Circuit Split: The Icebox Cometh: A Former
Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REv. 875, 935 n.287 (1998).
See Kenneth Williams, Should Judges Who Oppose Capital Punishment Resign? A Reply
to Justice Scalia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 317, 327 (2003) (describing Kozinsksi as "a
conservative judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit").
119. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2011).
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D.C. in 1993.120 Although multiple investigations ruled the shooting a
suicide, Favish was skeptical.2 As a New York Times article
reporting on oral argument before the Supreme Court put it, Favish
maintained "that the photographs would demonstrate inconsistencies
in the official reports of the death and show that the government had
been negligent in determining what really happened."'22 Favish was
not alone in holding this viewpoint."'
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
however, the Supreme Court concluded "that FOIA recognizes
surviving family members' right to personal privacy with respect to
their close relative's death-scene images."I 24 The Court determined
that the particular FOIA exemption providing such a right was 7(C),
which was added in the 1974 amendments to the original FOIA
statute in order "to prevent disclosures that could potentially
endanger law enforcement personnel, their families, and confidential
informants who cooperate with authorities."" Specifically,
Exemption 7(C) provides that FOIA does not apply to "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'26
120. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160-61 (2004). See
Jerry Seper, Foster Death Photos Protected, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at All
(reporting that "Foster's body was found on a grassy incline at Fort Marcy, a Civil War-era
battlefield park overlooking the Potomac River. It was slumped near a cannon. A 1913-
vintage revolver, which the report said belonged to the Foster family, was in his hand").
121. Favish, 541 U.S. at 161. See Warren Richey, A Family's Privacy vs. Public's Right
to Know, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Dec. 3, 2003, at 2 (reporting that there were "five
official investigations, including two by independent counsels. They have generated
thousands of pages of evidence, testimony, and analysis, and more than 100 photographs.
All five investigations reached the same conclusion: that Foster committed suicide").
122. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Case on Using Death Photos of Official, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at A26.
123. See Michael McGough, Top Court Blocks Release of Photos of Foster's Corpse-
Respect for Dead, Privacy of Clinton Lawyer's Family Cited, PiTr. POST-GAZETTE, Mar.
31, 2004, at A-5 (reporting that "[tlhe 1993 death of Foster, an intimate of the Clinton
family from Arkansas who served as deputy White House counsel, long has been a source
of speculation in conservative circles, where rumors swirl that he was killed to keep him
from revealing supposed crimes committed by then-President Bill Clinton and his wife,
now-New York Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton").
124. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
125. Martin E. Halstuk, When is an Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted Under the
FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court's "Sufficient Reason" and "Presumption of
Legitimacy" Standards, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361, 372 (2005).
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012).
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The Favish case boiled down to a matter of statutory
construction rather than the creation of a constitutional right, with
Justice Kennedy's opinion addressing whether the phrase "personal
privacy" in Exemption 7(C) narrowly encompassed only the right to
control information about oneselfl27-in this case, the self being the
deceased, Vincent Foster-or whether it extended more broadly to
family members of the deceased seeking "to secure their own refuge
from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and
tranquility[.]"l 28
In accepting the latter broader definition, Justice Kennedy dug
deep into a rather eclectic mix of sources to find "in our case law and
traditions the right of family members to direct and control
disposition of the body of the deceased and to limit attempts to
exploit pictures of the deceased family member's remains for public
purposes."'2 In bridging ancient burial rights with the ability to
control modern-day photos of the dead, Justice Kennedy cited the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopedia of Religion, Sophocles'
tragedy Antigone and, much more recently, "outrage at seeing the
bodies of American soldiers mutilated and dragged through the
streets[.J"o30  Justice Kennedy then deployed multiple cases from
across the United States13' to demonstrate what he called a common
law familial privacy right "over the body and death images of the
deceased[.]""
Among those cases was a New York appellate court decision
dating back more than one century, Schuyler v. Curtis.'33 In Schulyer,
the court held that "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for
the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a
violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the
deceased.""' Importantly, and as addressed later in Part IV, this
127. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 165 (noting that Allan Favish argued "that the individual
who is the subject of the information is the only one with a privacy interest" and that "the
family has no personal privacy interest covered by Exemption 7(C)").
128. Id. at 166.
129. Id. at 167.
130. Id. at 168.
131. See id. (citing Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333 (Wash. 1998), McCambridge v.
Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909 (Ark. 1989), and Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 155 S.E.
194 (Ga. 1930)).
132. Id. at 168.
133. Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1895).
134. Id. at 25.
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language from Schuyler cited approvingly by Justice Kennedy makes
it evident that the constitutional right later recognized in Marsh
serves intangible familial interests in memory and emotions.
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy wrote that the justices "can assume
Congress legislated against this background of law, scholarship, and
history when it enacted FOIA and when it amended Exemption 7(C)
to extend its terms."135
Judge Kozinski latched onto the Court's ruling in Favish to
provide the common law and traditional foundation necessary'" for
the Ninth Circuit's recognition of a constitutional privacy right
tethered to substantive due process. Kozinski wrote that the
Supreme Court came "close"' in Favish to recognizing such a
constitutional right but stopped short of doing so simply because it
"had no need to determine whether it [a common law right] is also
grounded in the Constitution."" Kozinski opined that:
[t]he Favish Court considered our history and
traditions, and found that "th[e] well-established
cultural tradition acknowledging a family's control
over the body and death images of the deceased has
long been recognized at common law." For precisely
the same reasons, we conclude that this right is also
protected by substantive due process.
In hindsight, perhaps Marsh was inevitable offshoot of Favish.
Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Favish,
Ken Paulson, current president and chief executive officer of the First
Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University,4 o opined in USA Today
that the decision stands as:
a reminder that as public, press and media push the
envelope with increasingly sensational content, courts
135. Favish, 541 U.S. at 169.
136. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing the history-and-tradition
requirement articulated in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
137. Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1154 (citation omitted).
140. See Ken Paulson, First Amendment Center, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/author/kenpaulson (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (providing biographical information on
Paulson).
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are going to be inclined to push back. To be fair, it's
not the mainstream media that judges truly worry
about. It's the uninhibited and unrestrained nature of
the Internet that probably gives them pause."'
Not only was Paulson correct about the role of the Internet-as
noted earlier, it was a pivotal feature in Judge Kozinski's Marsh
opinion "-but he further predicted that Favish was merely part of
"the first wave of developments signaling broader protection of
privacy"" that "certainly won't be the last."1" Eight years later and
in light of Marsh, those prognostications proved prescient and, as the
next part of this article explores, multiple courts and legislative bodies
have recognized the privacy obliterating role played by the Internet
when it comes to the sights and sounds of death.
III. The Sights and Sounds of Death: Rising Judicial, Legislative
and Scholarly Concerns About Privacy in the
Age of the Internet
The twenty-first century legislative precursor to the Supreme
Court's Favish opinion arose after requests were filed by news
organizations under Florida's open records laws for autopsy photos of
Dale Earnhardt, a NASCAR driver killed in a crash at Daytona
International Speedway in February 2001.'" More than thirty photos
were taken of Earnhardt's cadaver, and they automatically were
considered public documents subject to release under state law.146
Heeding the pleas of Earnhardt's widow, who was concerned the
photographs would be plastered on the Internet if released,'47 Florida
141. Ken Paulson, Inside the First Amendment: Supreme Court Places a Premium on
Privacy, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 2004, available on NewsBank electronic database.
142. Supra note 58.
143. Paulson, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. See generally Bill Adair, Privacy, Access at Odds in Foster Autopsy Case, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Nov. 30, 2003, at 1A (providing an overview of the disputes
involving photographs of both Earnhardt and Foster).
146. See Solove, supra note 73, at 1148 n.358 (noting that "fo]ver thirty photographs
were taken of Earnhardt's cadaver. Earnhardt's wife sought to keep the autopsy
photographs of Earnhardt from the public," and adding that "[u]nder Florida's public
records law, autopsy photographs are public documents, and the owner of a website that
specialized in posting gruesome autopsy photographs (along with a number of newspapers
and media entities) were interested in obtaining the photographs").
147. Samuel A. Terilli & Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-
Scene Photographs Relational Privacy, Public Records and Avoidable Collisions, 10
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lawmakers adopted a statute that generally exempts from public
disclosure photographs, videos and audio recording held by medical
examiners"' and made it apply retroactively.14 9 Balancing concerns
about newsworthiness against privacy," lawmakers incorporated into
the statute a provision allowing for viewing and copying of such
imagery "upon a showing of good cause.""' This determination must
be made by a judge after considering a trio of factors: "whether such
disclosure is necessary for the public evaluation of governmental
performance; the seriousness of the intrusion into the family's right to
privacy and whether such disclosure is the least intrusive means
available; and the availability of similar information in other public
records, regardless of form." 2
In 2002, a Florida appellate court upheld the law because it
"serve[d] an identifiable public purpose, is no broader than necessary
to meet that public purpose and was enacted in accordance with the
constitutional and legislative requirements.".. As for referencing
constitutional requirements, the appellate court found it permissible'
for the legislature to determine that a provision of the Florida
Constitution protecting privacy"' trumped another section providing
COMM. L. & POL'Y 313, 314-15 (2005). In making her case for keeping the autopsy photos
of her late husband private, Theresa Earnhardt asserted that "this issue is of vital
importance, not just to my family but to anyone ever faced with being exploited after
losing a loved one." Earnhardt's Widow Pleads for Privacy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), Mar. 5, 2001, at 2C. Theresa Earnhardt "said she feared that the pictures would
find their way onto the Web." Editorial, Newspaper Caved, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Fla.), Mar. 22, 2001, at 14A.
148. FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (2012). See generally Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private
Lives From Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict Between Constitutional Privacy and the
Accountability Principle of Democracy, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71, 94 (2003)
(observing that "[t]he public-record status of autopsy photos was restricted by the Florida
Legislature after the death of race-car driver Dale Earnhardt when a Florida newspaper
sought Earnhardt's autopsy records").
149. See FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (8) (2012) (providing that "[tihis exemption shall be
given retroactive application").
150. See supra Part VI (addressing concerns the tension between privacy and
newsworthiness).
151. FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (4) (a) (2012).
152. FLA. STAT. § 406.135 (4) (b) (2012).
153. Campus Commc'ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 395 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002).
154. Id. at 402-03.
155. See FLA. CONST., art. I, § 23 (2012) (providing that "[e]very natural person has
the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life
except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law").
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for public access to government documents."' In 2003, the Supreme
Court declined to hear the case."'
Other states, such as Louisiana,"' have carved out exemptions
from their open records laws regarding certain images of death."'
Georgia now generally prevents from public disclosure not only
autopsy photographs, 0 but also:
[c]rime scene photographs and video recordings,
including photographs and video recordings created or
produced by a state or local agency or by a perpetrator
or suspect at a crime scene, which depict or describe a
deceased person in a state of dismemberment,
decapitation, or similar mutilation including, without
limitation, where the deceased person's genitalia are
exposed.'
This aspect of Georgia law "was prompted by the murder of
graduate student Meredith Emerson and the subsequent request by a
Hustler magazine reporter for gruesome crime-scene photos." 62 As
with Florida, Georgia allows for disclosure of both autopsy and
crime-scene images when the public interest outweighs privacy
concerns.63  The bottom line is that "[a]lthough autopsy reports
156. See FLA. CONST., art. I, § 24(a) (2012) (providing, in relevant part, for "the right
to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official
business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their
behalf").
157. Campus Commc'ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003).
158. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:19 (2012) (providing, in relevant part, that
"photographs, video, or other visual images, in whatever form, of or relating to an autopsy
conducted under the authority of the office of the coroner shall be confidential, are
deemed not to be public records").
159. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.8 (2012) (providing that "a photograph or video or
audio recording of an official autopsy is not a public record," but "the text of an official
autopsy report ... is a public record and fully accessible by the public").
160. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(d) (2012).
161. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(e)(1) (2012).
162. Jim Tharpe, Senate Excludes Some 911 Calls, Crime Photos from Public Record,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 14, 2010, at 1A. See Bill Rankin, Photo Request Sparks an
Uproar, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 9, 2010, at lB (reporting that "Hustler Magazine's
request for crime-scene photos of the decapitated body of hiker Meredith Emerson was
met by outraged lawmakers who vowed on Monday to push legislation exempting such
photos from public release").
163. Specifically, when it comes to autopsy photos, Georgia provides that:
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traditionally are public record[s], privacy advocates are gaining
traction across the country in seeking confidentiality, in part because
of concerns that gruesome photos upsetting to the survivors may be
widely distributed online."'6 In 2009, for instance, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania concluded that although autopsy reports are
public records presumptively subject to disclosure under
Pennsylvania statutory law, "graphic photographs" included within
them may be suppressed based on privacy concerns where a trial
court deems it warranted.'
Professor Catherine Cameron explains in a relatively recent
article that "a big reason for the media's difficulty in defending the
need for public access to autopsy records and crime-scene
photographs is the ever-widening number of outlets that fall under
the term 'media.' Any person can put up a website and consider it a
media outlet."'" Likewise, Professors Samuel Terilli and Sigman
Splichal assert that "what has truly changed in recent years" 67 in the
A superior court may, in closed criminal investigations, order the
disclosure of such photographs upon findings in writing that disclosure
is in the public interest and that it outweighs any privacy interest that
may be asserted by the deceased's next of kin. In any such action, the
court shall review the photographs in question in camera and may
condition any disclosure on such measures as the court may deem
necessary to accommodate the interests of the parties before it.
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(d) (2012). In terms of disclosing crime-scene photos, the law
provides that:
[A] superior court may order the disclosure of such photographs or
video recordings upon findings in writing that disclosure is in the
public interest and outweighs any privacy interest that may be asserted
by the deceased person's next of kin. In making such determination,
the court shall consider whether such disclosure is necessary for public
evaluation of governmental performance, the seriousness of the
intrusion into the family's right to privacy, and whether such disclosure
is the least intrusive means available considering the availability of
similar information in other public records. In any such action, the
court shall review the photographs in question in camera with the
custodian of crime scene materials present and may condition any
disclosure on such condition as the court may deem necessary to
accommodate the interests of the parties.
GA. CODE ANN. § 45-16-27(e)(2) (2012).
164. Frank LoMonte, Transparency Tuesday: Dead Mean Tell No Tales, as States Shut
Down Access to Autopsy Reports, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER (July 17, 2012),
http://www.splc.org/wordpress/?p=3 915.
165. Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962 A.2d 632, 637 (Pa. 2009).
166. Catherine J. Cameron, Not Getting to Yes: Why the Media Should Avoid
Negotiating Access Rights, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 237, 242 (2007).
167. Terilli & Splichal, supra note 149, at 346.
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battle for access to death images and autopsy photos is "mass
reproduction and the Internet.""" Another legal commentator labels
the Internet:
a virtual graveyard where accident videos can be
viewed and corpses can be closely scrutinized under
the protection of the First Amendment. This explicit
content represents a quantum leap from the standard
obituary or the occasional article containing a
photograph of the deceased. Often devoid of
informative value, these digital images present a
challenge to our privacy law that is unlike anything our
courts have had to face in coming to prior holdings.
One such specimen demonstrating the Internet-based interest in
autopsy reports is a site called AutopsyFiles.org that boasts of its
"dedicat[ion] in providing autopsy reports of famous celebrities and
other infamous persons."o Another site features crime-scene photos,
warning visitors that "[m]any of the photos are extremely graphic and
may be considered by some to be disturbing or offensive.""' Finally,
there is a members-only site called Documenting Reality that features
videos and images of death."' As all of these sites suggest, the
concerns of both Brenda Marsh and Judge Kozinski about the
Internet posting of death images are very real.
That such images flourish on the Internet may be partly
attributable to the fact that journalists, bound by ethical and
professional responsibilities,m' no longer serve as gatekeepers or
intermediates for deciding what images reach the public at large.7 4
168. Id.
169. David Hamill, Note, The Privacy of Death on the Internet: A Legitimate Matter of
Public Concern or Morbid Curiosity, 25 J. Civ. RTS. & ECON. DEv. 833, 836 (2011).
170. AutopsyFiles.org, http://www.autopsyfiles.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
171. Crime Scene Photos, http://www.members.tripod.com/-VanessaWest/crimescene
photos.htmI (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
172. Documenting Reality, http://www.documentingreality.com/forum (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).
173. See generally Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics,
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (setting forth ethical obligations established by one of
the nation's leading journalism organizations).
174. Cf Kelly McBride, Questions to Consider Before Publishing Autopsy Reports,
POYNTER, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/everyday-ethics/186250/
questions-to-consider-before-publishing-autopsy-reports (providing an interesting and
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The rise of social media networks and the Internet have dramatically
affected the balance between privacy and publicity. As attorney
Lauren Gelman succinctly captures it:
Prior to the advent of the Internet era, individuals
lacked the technological megaphone to broadcast their
story to the world. Instead, their content was filtered
through news or other publishing intermediaries.
These entities played an important social role in
balancing the newsworthiness of information against
the privacy interests of third parties who were
identified. Now, individuals can no longer rely on
intermediaries to filter privacy-invasive content with
no "newsworthy" purpose from reaching a mass
audience."
In 2011, Florida went beyond shielding autopsy photos from
governmental release."' In particular, the Sunshine State adopted a
statute which generally provides that "[a] photograph or video or
audio recording that depicts or records the killing of a person is
confidential and exempt from" Florida's open records laws.'"7  And
when it comes to audio recordings of 911 calls that might capture a
caller's dying words, the National Conference of Legislatures
reported in 2012 that "[slix states-Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wyoming-keep 911 call recordings
confidential. Five other states-Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, North
Carolina and South Dakota-place some restrictions on the release of
911 calls or the information contained in them."""
Perhaps the most important pre-Marsh decision to grapple with
images of death and their posting on the Internet is Catsouras v.
Department of California Highway Patrol."9 The case pivoted on
timely analysis of the ethical concerns that journalists should address when reporting on
autopsies).
175. Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and "Blurry-Edged" Social Networks, 50
B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1333 (2009).
176. Infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
177. FLA. STAT. § 406.136(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
178. State Laws Relating to Confidentiality of 9-1-1 Call Recordings, NAT'L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURES, Jan. 11, 2012, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/
confidentiality-of-911-call-recordings.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
179. Catsouras v. Dep't of Calif. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal. Ct. App.
2010), modified, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 253 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2010), appeal &
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photos of a decapitated 18-year-old woman, Nicole Catsouras, taken
by members of the California Highway Patrol ("CHP") at the scene
of the car accident that took her life.'" Two CHP officers allegedly
"e-mailed the horrific photographs of decedent's mutilated corpse to
members of the public unrelated to the accident investigation.",81
That unauthorized dissemination began what the California appellate
court called "the unthinkable exploitation of the photographs of her
decapitated remains. Those photographs were strewn about the
Internet and spit back at the family members, accompanied by hateful
messages."" Indeed, the graphic photographs were still posted on
the Internet in August 2012 on a site fittingly called Best Gore,' and
at one point "more than 2,500 Internet Web sites in the United States
and the United Kingdom posted the photographs."'"
The appellate court held in 2010 that "family members have a
common law privacy right in the death images of a decedent, subject
to certain limitations."' After performing an extensive duty analysis
for a negligence cause of action, the appellate court concluded that
the CHP defendants "owed a duty of care to plaintiffs not to place
decedent's death images on the Internet for the lurid titillation of
persons unrelated to official CHP business."'" The case ultimately
ended when the CHP settled with the Catsouras family for a
whopping $2.375 million in January 2012 rather than go to trial facing
a decidedly bad set of facts.'
Nearing the issue that would squarely arise in Marsh, the
California appellate court in Catsouras considered the argument of
the deceased's family members that "they ha[d] a constitutionally
depublication request(s) denied, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 3456 (Cal. Apr. 14, 2010). See generally
Clay Calvert, Salvaging Privacy & Tranquility From the Wreckage: Images of Death,
Emotions of Distress & Remedies of Tort in the Age of the Internet, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV.
311 (2010) (providing an in-depth analysis of the appellate court's Catsouras ruling).
180. Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 357-58.
181. Id. at 358.
182. Id. at 357.
183. Porsche Girl Nicki Catsouras Car Crash Photos, BestGore.com,
http://www.bestgore.com/road-accidents/porsche-girl-nikki-catsouras-carcrash-photos (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013).
184. Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 359.
185. Id. at 358.
186. Id. at 376.
187. Greg Hardesty, Family Gets $2.4 Million Over Grisly Crash Images, ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER (Cal.), Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/family-
337967-catsouras-nikki.html.
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protected right of privacy in decedent's photographs."'" The
appellate court, however, noted that the "parties cite no California or
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case addressing whether a complaint
alleging a violation of a family member's privacy right to photographs
of a decedent is sufficient to state a cause of action""' for a civil rights
violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" The court held that the CHP
officers were entitled to qualified immunity because whether or not
such a constitutional right to privacy over death-scene images existed
in October 2006 when the photos were taken and transmitted was not
clearly established.'
In Marsh, Kozinski cited Catsouras favorably to support the
proposition that courts, in addition to the Supreme Court in Favish,
"have also recognized family members' privacy right in a decedent's
death images."" He acknowledged, however, that Catsouras and an
Ohio federal district court opinion called Melton v. Board of County
Commissioners,'3 both described "the well-established common law
right, not a constitutional right."' 94 As Kozinski wrote, "[a]lthough
the Catsouras court found a state privacy right over death images, it
found no clearly established federal right."'95
The bottom line is that the ubiquitous presence of the Internet as
a cheap and convenient vehicle for posting in perpetuity graphic
images of death and the dead is helping to propel decisions like
Marsh and Catsouras. As Jon Mills, Dean emeritus of the University
of Florida's Levin College of Law, recently wrote, "[t]oday's toxic mix
of easy access to digital photos, easy global distribution via the
Internet and the ability to distribute anonymously is a perfect storm
for horrible intrusions."'" Although battles over access to graphic
death-scene images certainly captured judicial attention before
188. Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385.
189. Id.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2011) (providing for a civil action remedy against state and
local government officials, acting under color of state authority, for "the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws").
191. Catsouras, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)
(providing a review of the qualified immunity doctrine and the two prongs used in
qualified immunity analyses).
192. Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012).
193. Melton v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 267 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
194. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154 (emphasis added).
195. Id. at 1159.
196. Jon Mills, A Privacy Right for Web, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 23, 2010,
at 9A.
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widespread adoption of the Internet in cases such as State v. Rolling,"
those courts did not need to evaluate the game-changing
dissemination force that is the Internet. In fact, in Rolling, which
centered on public and media access to images of the murder victims
of Danny Rolling in Gainesville, Florida while he was standing trial,
the local judge presiding over the case wrote:
The potential for substantial injury to innocent
third parties presumptively applies to the intimate
relatives of murdered victims. The content of the
subject matter-the photographs of the nude bodies,
the stab wounds and mutilations of the victims-can
reasonably be expected to cause extreme emotional
distress and trauma if encountered in supermarket
tabloids, newspapers, magazines, television programs
or the like, especially since these involve utilization of
the photographs for commercial gain. 8
This passage is devoid of any reference to the Internet, where
today seemingly anyone can post anything to anyone forever. The
reasonable expectation for extreme emotional distress described by
Judge Stan Morris in Rolling is, as the opinions in Marsh and
Catsouras intimate with their references to the Internet,'9
exponentially compounded by this medium. In fact, academics today
have a name for the underlying phenomenon about which judges in
cases like Marsh and Catsouras fret-Internet spectatorship.2 0 It
refers to "the 'illicit' looking enabled by new media technologies the
looking that takes place outside the mainstream news makers' control
and sanction for public consumption."2 0' Such spectatorship, as noted
above, compounds emotional harm suffered by family members.2 0
Justice Kennedy's recitation in Favish of the traditional privacy
concerns surrounding death thus melded in Marsh with twenty-first
century worries about the Internet to produce a nascent
197. State v. Rolling, No. 91-3832 CF A, 1994 WL 722891 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1994)
(involving the prosecution of Danny Rolling for the murder of several college students in
Gainesville, Fla.).
198. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
199. Supra notes 197, 192, and 179.
200. Sue Tait, Pornographies of Violence? Internet Spectatorship on Body Horror, 25
CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 91 (2008).
201. Id. at 92.
202. Supra notes 197, 192, and 179.
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constitutional privacy right. But is this right decidedly different from
other privacy interests protected by the federal constitution? The
next part of the article explores that issue.
IV. Preserving Memories and Emotional Tranquility: Different
Justifications Animating Constitutional Privacy?
At its core, Marsh creates-in the name of privacy and via the
prevention of governmental release of death images-a legally
protected constitutional interest in memory preservation of the living
about the dead. This certainly seems, at first blush, to constitute an
important legal interest and it may, when viewed from a much
broader perspective, embody a "form of memorial culture.,"2 03 In a
2001 article, for instance, Professor Jessica Berg writes that "[t]he
dead live on in the memories of the living. Harms to the memory of
the deceased may entail very real harms to people now living who
have an interest in preserving the original memory, such as relatives
or close friends of the deceased."20
An examination from outside the realm of law reinforces the
nexus between emotional tranquility of the living and preserving their
happy memories of the deceased. For instance, the authors of a 2011
study of mothers who faced the sudden loss of a child-the scenario
confronted by Brenda Marsh-found that they "expressed the need
to engage in activities, memories, and people who promote a feeling
of peace and well-being,"20 while simultaneously avoiding "activities
that could potentially cause feelings of unhappiness and negativity."'
Viewing a gruesome death-scene image or autopsy photograph of
one's child intuitively seems tantamount to an activity that would
cause such unhappiness and that a grieving mother would attempt to
avoid. The authors of the same study found that for the mothers,
"[s]imply remembering their child and having the opportunity to talk
to others and share pleasant stories helped them cope with the loss
they have experienced." 207 Furthermore, mothers like Brenda Marsh
who lose a child seem emotionally vulnerable, with a recent article in
203. Tim Flohr Sorensen, Sweet Dreams: Biographical Blanks and the
Commemoration of Children, 16 MORTALITY 161, 166 (2011).
204. Jessica Berg, Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem
Confidentiality, 34 CONN. L. REv. 81, 99 (2001).
205. Brenda S. Parker & Karen S. Dunn, The Continued Lived Experience of the
Unexpected Death of a Child, 63 J. DEATH & DYING 221, 223 (2011) (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
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Mortality noting that "the death of a child is widely considered an
unquestionable tragedy,"2 08as "the deceased child is circumscribed by
narratives of unjust and untimely bereavement."209
By limiting distribution of death images, the Ninth Circuit in
Marsh is helping relatives with the process of memory management
and emotion regulation by reducing the odds of inadvertently
stumbling upon a disturbing image that could disrupt an otherwise
joyful or pleasant memory narrative. Such an occurrence could
trigger what psychologists call an "intrusive memory"210 of a
distressing event. Research suggests that affective disorders such as
depression and posttraumatic stress disorder "are often characterized
by an exacerbated bias in retrieving and ruminating on negative
memories." " All of this paints the Brenda Marshes of the world in a
highly sympathetic light that, in turn, strengthens the call for
constitutional protection.
By analogy, in their book Death, Memory & Material Culture,
Professors Elizabeth Hallam and Jenny Hockey write, "there are
aspects of material environments that are perceived as
'uncontrollable.' Unexpectedly finding an old garment at the back of
a wardrobe yields an upsetting reminder that the person who once
wore it is gone forever." The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Marsh
provides a certain amount of control to prevent similar inadvertent
photographic discoveries that could trigger intrusive, negative
memories. Hallam and Hockey add that photographs stand "as a
central medium for infusing" memories, 2 and a mother like Brenda
Marsh certainly would not want her memory of a deceased toddler to
be infused with a grisly photo. Such a horrid photo of death stands
counter-posed to the staged postmortem photography of the early
twentieth century in which the deceased "were arranged in a posture
of restful sleep so that their final image, captured by the camera, was
one of a still life-like presence." 214  Today, even such contrived
208. Sorensen, supra note 203, at 161.
209. Id.
210. See generally Marcella L. Woud et al., Ameliorating Intrusive Memories of
Distressing Experiences Using Computerized Reappraisal Training, 12 EMOTION 778, 779
(2012) (discussing intrusive memories).
211. Ekaterina Denkova et al., Reliving Emotional Personal Memories: Affective
Biases Linked to Personality and Sex-Related Differences, 12 EMOTION 515, 515 (2012).
212. ELIZABETH HALLAM & JENNY HOCKEY DEATH, MEMORY & MATERIAL
CULTURE 105 (2001).
213. Id. at 143.
214. Id. at 144.
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pleasant imagery of the dead has fallen out of favor, as it is "images of
the living body that come into focus as a site for the generation of
socially acceptable memories."
But even if all of this is true-even if one reflexively feels vast
empathy and sympathy for individuals like Brenda Marsh-there is
still something very different about the ultimate outcome (happy
memory preservation and emotional tranquility) served by the
privacy right fashioned in Marsh when it is compared to the outcomes
facilitated by other niches of constitutional privacy. In brief, both
interests-memory and emotions-are intangible mental states or
mindsets.
Marsh embodies a bit of judicial jujitsu because it amounts to an
effort to block a truthful reality-in this case, the gory and grisly truth
depicting a deceased toddler-from interfering with the constructed
postmortem narratives people would prefer to embrace. Viewed
cynically, Marsh creates a constitutional right premised on concealing
the truth and hiding it from familial and public view. The truth hurts,
as the clich6 goes, and the law steps in here to lessen its sting.
Certainly, the interests in happy memory preservation and
emotional tranquility are distinct from the ones that animated the
high court's decision in Roe v. Wade21 1 in which, as Professor David
Flaherty notes, it "was a woman's right to choose an abortion that
became the vehicle for enunciating a right to privacy."2 17  The
outcome or consequence preserved and protected by the Roe niche of
privacy (having a child or aborting one) is far more tangible than
preserving how one thinks about or remembers a child that has died.
Roe affects a child's entire future; Marsh affects the memories of a
deceased child. Put differently and perhaps more provocatively,
autonomy over one's body and of one's choices regarding it218 are
distinct from some ethereal kind of autonomy over memory that must
not be violated by governmental release of a photograph.
A liberty interest in happy memory preservation and freedom
from any emotional interference that the release of an image of one's
deceased child may cause is far different from other liberty interests
215. Id. at 146.
216. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
217. David H. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data
Protection, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831, 839 (1991).
218. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857
(1992) (observing that Roe may be viewed as embracing "a rule (whether or not mistaken)
of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing
limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection").
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such as the right to have children or how a child should be raised and
educated.219 How one chooses to raise and educate a child after
deciding whether or not to have a child is far removed from how one
recalls a child that has passed away. The former involve parental
decisions that directly affect the wellbeing and future of a living
being, while the latter does not.
Furthermore, while the constitutional right to privacy, as
Professor Radhika Rao writes, is "typically invoked in support of the
individual's right to marry, to form a family, to procreate or not
procreate, to rear children, and to engage in sexual activity," 220 each
and every one of those rights has possible consequences for a living
child. For instance, some people may believe that children should
only be conceived and raised by a married couple, while others may
believe that sexual activity serves the primary purpose of bearing
children. In Marsh, a child already is dead; no parental choice
regarding whether to have a child, how to raise a child, or how to
educate a child is affected. While it certainly is true, as the Supreme
Court observed in the forced sterilization case of Skinner v.
Oklahoma22' that "[mlarriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race,"222 preserving happy
memories-or preventing painful realities of gruesome deaths from
encroaching on them-are not.
Ultimately, if the judiciary is going to continue to hold that the
U.S. Constitution protects happy memories by thwarting the release
of truthful imagery, as the Ninth Circuit did in Marsh,223 then perhaps
jurists should better understand the meaning of memory, as well as
how memory functions and operates. Entire academic journals-one
called Memory and another entitled Memory Studies-are devoted to
the subject. Memory, like the issue of when life begins that clouds
Roe and its progeny, is far from a simple subject. As John Lucas of
219. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (observing that "the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes," among other liberties, the right
"to have children" and "to direct the education and upbringing of one's children")(citations omitted).
220. Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1998).
221. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
222. Id. at 541.
223. See Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that the "Constitution protects a parent's right to control the physical
remains, memory and images of a deceased child against unwarranted public exploitation
by the government") (emphasis added).
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the Mayo Clinic writes, "[m]emory is not a unitary construct but
instead reflects a number of distinct cognitive abilities that can be
categorized along a number of different dimensions,"224 such as short-
term (primary) memory and long-term (secondary) memory," as well
as explicit memory and implicit memory. ' Furthermore, others view
memory as a social construction and assert that "the past is
constructed and reconstructed on the basis of present needs.""' Thus,
it has been written that "it is not unusual for the very term 'memory'
to mean many things to many people."228
The Ninth Circuit has fashioned a new niche of constitutional
privacy that thwarts the public release of truthful imagery in the
interest of memory preservation and emotional tranquility. It is now
left to other courts to better explicate precisely what memory means
in this context. If an interest is truly to rise to the rarified level of a
constitutional concern, then it must be understood and dissected with
the same analytical rigor given to other interests such as the nature of
abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.229
V. Expanding Marsh Beyond Death Images:
Constitutional Incrementalism Toward a
Broader Right of Informational Privacy?
Photographs convey information. As articulated previously, "[a]
powerful photograph can tell a story as no words can." 230  First
Amendment protection for expression thus applies equally to
photographs and words.23' Both Chief Justice John Roberts and
224. John A. Lucas, Memory, Overview, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HUMAN BRAIN,
VOL. II 817, 817 (V. S. Ramachandran ed., 2002).
225. Id. at 817-18.
226. Kathleen B. McDermott, Memory, Explicit and Implicit, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE HUMAN BRAIN, VOL. 11773 (V. S. Ramachandran ed., 2002).
227. Tara L. Tober, Memory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IDENTITY 444 (Ronald L.
Jackson II & Michael A. Hogg eds., 2010).
228. Jos6 Maria Ruiz-Vargas, Memory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT 570, 573 (Rocio Fern~ndez-Ballesteros ed., 2003).
229. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
230. Brown, supra note 97, at 75.
231. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (observing that "[a]s with
pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, both oral utterance and the printed
word have First Amendment protection until they collide with the long-settled position of
this Court that obscenity is not protected by the Constitution").
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Professor Rebecca Tushnet have recently expounded on the power of
images."'
It thus seems fair, given the informational and emotional power
of images, to consider how Marsh might influence or otherwise affect
the development of a still inchoate constitutional right to
informational privacy. This is especially true given the
acknowledgement in Marsh of the informational impact of
photographs when Judge Kozinski wrote, "[i]mages of the body
usually reveal a great deal about the manner of death and the
decedent's suffering during his final moments."
As framed by Justice John Paul Stevens back in 1977, the
Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe234 considered the issue of "whether
the State of New York may record, in a centralized computer file, the
names and addresses of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a
doctor's prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful
and an unlawful market."2 35 The law sought to prevent the misuse and
abuse of the drugs, both in the prescription process and in their
236consumption. A group of patients receiving some of the drugs, as
well doctors who prescribed them and two physicians' associations,
challenged the law,3 claiming it "invade[d] a constitutionally
protected 'zone of privacy."'"3
In the opinion, Justice Stevens noted that constitutional privacy
features two branches-"the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters,"23 9 and "the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions."24 Both were implicated in the
case, Stevens wrote, since the law "threatens to impair both their
[patients' and doctors'] interest in the nondisclosure of private
information and also their interest in making important decisions
independently."24 ' Ultimately, however, the Court ruled that the
232. Supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The One-
Way Mirror: Law, Privacy, and the Media, 82 WASH. U. L. REV. 319, 324 (2004)
(observing that "as the old saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words").
233. Marsh v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012).
234. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
235. Id. at 591.
236. Id. at 591-92 (where the Court found that existing laws failed to prevent the
public from illicitly obtaining prescription drugs).
237. Id. at 595.
238. Id. at 598.
239. Id. at 599.
240. Id. at 599-600.
241. Id. at 600.
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record before it did "not establish an invasion of any right or liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 24 2
In dicta, Justice Stevens wrote that the Court was aware "of the
threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of
personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files," 243 and suggested that a statutory and regulatory
duty imposed on government entities and officials not to reveal some
of that information "arguably has its roots in the Constitution." 2"
Fast-forward more than three decades and the "arguably" aspect
of that dicta was still very much in play in National Aeronautics and
Space Administration v. Nelson.245 The case centered on a challenge
to background investigations conducted on government contract
employees working at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory ("JPL") in
southern California. 246 The employees objected to questions relating
to treatment or counseling for recent illegal drug use, as well as
queries regarding their designated references. 247 They alleged "that
the background-check process violates a constitutional right to
informational privacy." 248
Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Samuel Alito began
Nelson by stating that "[w]e assume, without deciding, that the
Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in
Whalen,"249 namely "a constitutional privacy 'interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters."'250 As noted in the Introduction,
however, two justices-Scalia and Thomas-bluntly wrote that "[a]
federal constitutional right to 'informational privacy' does not
exist."' 25
2
Despite the unsettled status at the level of the nation's highest
judicial authority, Professor Mary D. Fan observed in 2012 that "the
majority of the federal courts of appeals and a number of state courts
have ... accorded the idea of informational privacy constitutional
242. Id. at 606.
243. Id. at 605.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Nelson III, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
246. Id. at 751-52.
247. Id. at 751.
248. Id. at 754.
249. Nelson III, 131 S. Ct at 754.Id. (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.
252. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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stature."253 Indeed, she writes that among lower courts, the "right has
flourished by assumption over the decades."25 4 Yet the cases in which
it has been invoked have not involved information in the form of
images of dead humans, but rather in cases involving facts about
living individuals such as their HIV status, sexual orientation, health
records and financial information.
Photographs certainly do provide information, but the ones at
issue in Marsh provided no personal information that could
negatively jeopardize job, physical health or finances. In fact, the
information at stake in Marsh really is only relational-it is about a
relative-rather than personal to those who assert a right of privacy,
like Brenda Marsh. Put differently, the only information revealed is
about a relative, namely that the relative is dead and visual clues
relating to the possible cause of death.
In Marsh, however, Judge Kozinski made the argument that the
information at stake was personal, quoting Whalen while opining that
"the publication of death images interferes with 'the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters' . . . Few things are
more personal than the graphic details of a close family member's
tragic death."2 16 But this may be confusing the effect or impact of the
information-a personal effect on a living individual-with the nature
of the information itself.
What is particularly intriguing here, at least in terms of searching
for clues about what Marsh may portend for a constitutional right to
informational privacy, is that Nelson came up to the Supreme Court
through the Ninth Circuit and involved written opinions by two of the
judges in Marsh-Judge Kozinski and Judge Wardaw.25 In June
2008, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit ordered that a
preliminary injunction be issued against certain aspects of the
background checks because the JPL employees "raised serious
questions as to the merits of their informational privacy claim and the
balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor."2" That opinion was
written by Judge Wardlaw, although neither Judge Kozinski nor
253. Mary J. Fan, Constitutionalizing Informational Privacy by Assumption, 14 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 953, 974-75 (2012).
254. Id. at 956.
255. Id. at 975 n.121.
256. Marsh, 680 F.3d at 1154.
257. Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 568 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009)
(hereinafter Nelson 11).
258. Nelson v. Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) (hereinafter Nelson I).
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Judge Paez-the other two judges on the Ninth Circuit's Marsh
opinion-were on that 2008 Nelson panel. But the key opinions in
Nelson by Judge Wardlaw and Judge Kozinski arguably came in 2009
when the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc.m
In his dissent from the denial of that petition, Judge Kozinski
characterized informational privacy as a "free-floating privacy
guarantee,"26 adding that "[w]e have a grab bag of cases on specific
issues, but no theory as to what this right (if it exists) is all about. The
result in each case seems to turn more on instinct than on any
overarching principle."26 ' He characterized the law in this area as "so
subjective and amorphous."2 62
This may suggest that for Judge Kozinski, the narrow and concise
familial right of preventing governmental disclosure of death images
in Marsh is different from some larger, amorphous and "free-
floating"m general right of informational privacy that might thwart
disclosure of other types of information. In Nelson, Judge Kozinski
pointed out an important distinction in the realm of informational
privacy that, for him, must be addressed before it can be embraced as
a constitutional right: the collection of information versus the
dissemination of information.2 M The right in Marsh focuses only on
the latter aspect of informational privacy, as it guards against public
disclosure by governmental employees of death images, not their
collection or taking. There was never an issue in Marsh about
whether the government could take or collect autopsy photos in its
investigation of potential criminal activity; it was only their public
release by Jay Coulter that sparked the case. Judge Kozinski
intimated that there may be no need to create an informational
privacy right when it comes to the collection of information (as
contrasted with its dissemination), opining that:
Government acquisition of information is already
regulated by express constitutional provisions,
particularly those in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. How can the creation of new
constitutional constraints be squared with the
259. Nelson II, 568 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2009).
260. Id. at 1052 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1054.
263. Id. at 1052.
264. Id.
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teachings of Medina v. California, which cautioned
against discovering protections in the Due Process
Clause in areas where the "Bill of Rights speaks in
explicit terms"? 265
Thus, to the extent that Judge Kozinski is at all inclined to
recognize a general constitutional right to informational privacy, it
would seem that Marsh would fit within his apparent view of
confining it to the disclosure side of the equation. At most, then, the
right in Marsh amounts to a possible move of constitutional
incrementalism toward a broader right that would shield other
specific types of information from governmental release and
dissemination.266 If governmental disclosure of personal information
is what might be called the big-picture problem, then incrementalism
may make sense because it "has the virtue of breaking down an
enormous problem into manageable parts. "
In setting forth her views on informational privacy in Nelson,
Judge Wardlaw suggested the right applied to sexual orientation,
personal financial information, medical information and sexual
activities." She did not suggest or otherwise intimate that the right
would sweep up images like those at issue in Marsh. Rather, Judge
Wardlaw's concern was that the questions asked in Nelson touched on
"the most private aspects"269 of plaintiffs' lives. Ultimately, the
information at issue in Marsh seems decidedly different from that at
issue in most informational privacy cases, and Marsh, thus, may either
represent one tiny sliver of (or step toward) a larger informational
privacy right or it may be distinct from it altogether.
265. Nelson II, 568 F.3d at 1052-53 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443
(1992)).
266. See generally Suzanna Sherry, Cal Turner Professor of Law and Leadership,
Vanderbilt University Law School, Keynote Address, Politics and Judgment, 70 MO. L.
REV. 973, 982 (2005) (observing that "[i]n both common law and constitutional
adjudication, incrementalism and adherence to precedent work hand-in-hand to ensure
that the law will change slowly, through accretion and subtle revision rather than through
sudden or fundamental shifts in policy," and asserting that the "most famous example of
constitutional incrementalism is the story of Brown v. Board of Education, the case that
held racially segregated schools unconstitutional. The Court acted gradually-some
would say too gradually-both in declaring segregation unconstitutional and in
implementing its decision").
267. Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of
Gun Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 516 (2008).
268. Nelson II, 568 F.3d at 1037-38 (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
269. Id. at 1032.
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VI. A Constitutional Conflict on the Legal Horizon?
Privacy's Tension With First Amendment Freedoms
While Marsh posits the existence of a constitutional right of
familial privacy to control images of death possessed by government
officials and agencies, this newfound entitlement potentially runs
headfirst into a longstanding First Amendment privilege to publish
newsworthy information. For instance, a plaintiff suing under the tort
theory of public disclosure of private facts270 based upon the
publication of a death-scene image typically would lose if the image
were deemed newsworthy.7 ' As the Supreme Court of California has
observed, "the analysis of newsworthiness inevitably involves
accommodating conflicting interests in personal privacy and in press
freedom as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution."m7 Put slightly differently by the Supreme Court of
Colorado, a plaintiff suing under the theory of public disclosure of
private facts will only prevail if "the facts disclosed are not of
legitimate concern to the public."2 73 The "requirement that the facts
disclosed must not be of legitimate concern to the public protects the
rights of free speech and free press guaranteed by the United
States." 27 4 In brief, the law of privacy "often bends in the interest of
promoting free speech,"7  with newsworthiness standing as "an
essential balance point between privacy and the rights of the press."2 6
Layered on top of the immunity from privacy tort liability for
publishing newsworthy information is the fact that contemporary
First Amendment doctrine provides the press with what was recently
described as "almost absolute protection to publish truthful
270. As encapsulated by the Supreme Court of Texas:
the invasion of privacy tort for public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts .. .has three elements: (1) publicity was given to matters
concerning one's personal life, (2) publication would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, and (3) the
matter publicized is not of legitimate public concern.
Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473-74 (Tex. 1995).
271. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998) (finding that the
"lack of newsworthiness is an element of the 'private facts' tort, making newsworthiness a
complete bar to common law liability").
272. Id.
273. Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 378 (Colo. 1997).
274. Id. at 379.
275. Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and "Blurry-Edged" Social Networks, 50
B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2009).
276. Gajda, supra note 86, at 1061.
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information that is lawfully acquired."m Indeed, in Bartnicki v.
Vopper,278 the Supreme Court reinforced the notion in 2001 that
publication by the press of truthful information about a matter of
public significance that it has lawfully obtained cannot be punished
unless the government can prove an interest of the highest order.279
How does this implicate cases like Marsh? It will be recalled that
prosecutor Jay Coulter gave an autopsy image of Phillip Buell to two
news organizations, both of which ultimately chose not to publish it.'
But what if those media outlets had published the image to
accompany a news story addressing disagreements on the cause of
Phillip Buell's death? And what, in turn, if Brenda Marsh had sued
those two news organizations under the tort theory of public
disclosure of private facts?
Initially, it is important to note that the two news organizations
lawfully obtained the photograph-the photo was sent to them,
without any apparent solicitation or request, by Jay Coulter.281 The
cause of Phillip Buell's death, in turn, would seem to be a newsworthy
issue, particularly in light of the judiciary tossing out Kenneth
Marsh's conviction. 2 The photograph arguably would provide ocular
information to members of the public about the extent of the trauma
to Phillip Buell's head that would, in turn, allow them to draw their
own conclusions regarding his death. In other words, it would reflect
the same argument made by Alan Favish regarding why it was
important for the public to see the death-scene images of Vincent
Foster.283
But just as privacy is a maddening concept,m so too is
newsworthiness an "elusive concept."m The Supreme Court, in 2011
in Snyder v. Phelps,6 attempted to flesh out the meaning of the
277. William E. Lee, Probing Secrets: The Press and Inchoate Liability for
Newsgathering Crimes, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L, 129, 134 (2009).
278. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
279. Id. at 528 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
280. Supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
281. Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
282. Supra note 43 and accompanying text.
283. Supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (addressing the difficulties in
pinning down a definition of privacy).
285. David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, Remedies, Neutral Rules and Free Speech,
39 AKRON L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2006).
286. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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interchangeable concept of public concern.28 After noting that
speech about matters of public concern lies at the core of the First
Amendment and must be given special protectionm Chief Justice
John Roberts wrote for the majority that speech addresses a matter of
public concern when it either: 1. "can 'be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community,' 8 1 or 2. "'is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is,
a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public."' 2" The chief justice added that this determination involves
consideration of the context, content and form of the speech. 9
Although this test arguably is "riddled with ambiguities that lower
courts must now sort through,"" its existence nonetheless suggests
that future courts-perhaps even the U.S. Supreme Court-who visit
the familial right to privacy over images of death might attempt to
carve out a specific exemption from it when the images in question
are highly probative of a matter of public concern.
Imagine that a government employee releases to a newspaper
several autopsy photos because he believes they demonstrate what he
considers to be the indefensibly sloppy and shoddy nature of the
autopsy procedures performed by the government's medical
examiner. In other words, the photos could serve as visual proof of
governmental malfeasance and, in turn, might prompt an
investigation into the medical examiner's autopsy procedures.
Such an exception, in fact, is built into Florida Statute Section
406.136, which took effect on July 1, 2011, and generally mandates
that "[a] photograph or video or audio recording that depicts or
records the killing of a person is confidential and exempt from" 93
Florida's open records laws. The statute provides, however, that such
recordings of killings may be viewed or copied "upon a showing of
287. Courts often use "newsworthiness" and "public concern" interchangeably. See,
e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998) (observing that it "is
in the determination of newsworthiness-in deciding whether published or broadcast
material is of legitimate public concern-that courts must struggle most directly to
accommodate the conflicting interests of individual privacy and press freedom")
(emphasis added); Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 781, 824 (2009) (writing that "whether something is of a legitimate public concern
turns on a determination of newsworthiness").
288. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215.
289. Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
290. Id. (quoting San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004)).
291. Id.
292. Calvert, Defining "Public Concern", supra note 24, at 70.
293. FLA. STAT. § 406.136 (2) (2012).
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good cause."294 One of three factors that courts must consider in a
good-cause determination is "[w]hether such disclosure is necessary
for the public evaluation of governmental performance."'9 Shoddy
performance by the medical examiner's office would appear to fall
within the ambit of this factor. Similarly, the hypothetical release of
death-scene photos involving victims of police shootings could be
relevant in a determination of whether officers exercised excessive
force or engaged in a particular pattern of response.
Requiring courts to balance a constitutional right to familial
privacy over images of death against the newsworthiness or public
value of the images comports with many other aspects of substantive
due process-based constitutional rights. For instance, a woman's right
to choose to have an abortion is not absolute. As Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote in 1992:
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited ... that
from the outset the State cannot show its concern for
the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal
development the State's interest in life has sufficient
force so that the right of the woman to terminate the
pregnancy can be restricted.296
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
the Court fashioned an "undue burden" test for determining whether
state-imposed restrictions violate a woman's right to choose to have
an abortion.297 Courts evaluating the scope of a familial right to
privacy to control death images might similarly consider whether,
based upon the specific facts at issue in any given case, this right
unduly burdens the public's right to know newsworthy information
affecting governmental affairs.
The bottom line here is, as Professor Anita Allen points out, that
the Supreme Court has held that "fundamental constitutional privacy
294. FLA. STAT. § 406.136 (4) (a) (2012).
295. FLA. STAT. § 406.136 (4) (b) (2012) (emphasis added). The other factors include
"[tihe seriousness of the intrusion into the family's right to privacy and whether such
disclosure is the least intrusive means available" and "[tihe availability of similar
information in other public records, regardless of form." Id.
296. Planned Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869(1992).
297. See id. at 878 (observing that "[a]n undue burden exists, and therefore a provision
of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability").
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rights may yield to compelling state interests."298  Future courts
applying Marsh's new privacy right should recognize that it must
yield, under certain circumstances, to an unenumerated First
Amendment right of the public to receive newsworthy information.
VII. Conclusion
In February 2012-just three months before he authored
Marsh-Alex Kozinski made the following observation during a
keynote symposium address at Stanford Law School:
No matter how private, dangerous, hurtful,
sensitive, or secret a piece of information may be, any
fool with a computer and an Internet connection-
which means just about everybody-can post it online,
never again to be private or secret. They say that
removing something from the Internet is about as easy
as removing urine from a swimming pool, and that's
pretty much the story.29
In Marsh, Judge Kozinski and his Ninth Circuit colleagues took a
constitutional step forward that may prevent at least some of those
fools from gaining access to and later posting on the Internet one
particular form of hurtful information-images of death held in the
possession of government entities. But in doing so, as this article has
suggested, the Ninth Circuit has embraced two intangible interests-
memory preservation and emotional tranquility-that seem different
from those at stake in cases like Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas.
More than twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court of Oregon
cogently observed that although the term privacy "denotes a personal
or cultural value placed on seclusion or personal control over access
to places or things, thoughts or acts,"300 it also is "a difficult legal
concept to delimit,""o' with "[1]awyers and theorists debat[ing] the
298. Anita L. Allen, Privacy, Surrogacy, and the Baby M Case, 76 GEO. L.J. 1759, 1765
(1988).
299. Alex Kozinski, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Symposium Keynote, The Dead Past, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 124 (Apr.
2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/ 6 4-
SLRO-117.pdf.
300. Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., Inc., 712 P.2d 803, 808 (Or. 1986).
301. Id.
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nature of the interests that privacy law means to protect."02 The
Ninth Circuit's 2012 ruling in Marsh ultimately throws a new wrinkle
into the morass of privacy law by privileging, in constitutional fashion,
a cultural recognition of familial sanctity surrounding death and the
ability of the living to carve out a zone of privacy for grieving,
memorializing and remembering the deceased. And while it may
have been true back in 2004 that "the topic of access to images of
death ha[d] developed into a fertile new battleground,"03 Marsh shifts
the fight to a constitutional battlefield that ultimately should be
contested at the Supreme Court.
Beyond representing a possible incremental step toward a
broader right of informational privacy, Marsh, if extended, might
buttress future judicial recognition of what Professor Njeri Mathis
Rutledge calls a constitutional right to mourn-a right she readily
acknowledges "has not yet been established."a Such a right might
prove pivotal, she points out, in supporting laws targeting the funeral-
protest expression of groups like the Westboro Baptist Church.-5
Although perhaps no more than a constitutional coincidence, it is
worth noting that the bridge between Favish and Marsh is paved by a
connection between the authors of those opinions, Anthony Kennedy
and Alex Kozinski, respectively. Kozinski clerked for Kennedy when
Kennedy was on the Ninth Circuit." Kennedy, in turn, has selected
multiple law clerks over his years on the Supreme Court from Judge
Kozinski." In Marsh, Kozinski channeled Kennedy's concerns in
Favish but to a constitutional result.
Finally, it is one thing to compensate relatives of the dead for
emotional distress under principles of tort law when they are
302. Id.
303. Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Voyeurism Value in the First Amendment: From the
Sexually Sordid to the Details of Death, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 721, 735 (2004).
304. Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech
Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 305 (2008).
305. Rutledge, supra note 307, at 304 (writing that "[a]n important issue in
determining whether a statute is constitutional is the governmental interest involved. The
governmental interest involved in the funeral picketing statutes is protection of what I
characterize as 'the right to mourn"').
306. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Federal Judicial Center,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx,
using this link, one can find Judge Kozinski's official biography, which notes that he
clerked for Justice Anthony Kennedy from 1975-76).
307. David J. Garrow, Acolytes in Arms, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 411, 417 (2006) (asserting
that "Justice Anthony M. Kennedy selected fifteen clerks from Ninth Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski, an outspoken conservative, up through 2004").
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intentionally or recklessly exposed to gruesome images of their
deceased loved ones? It is quite another thing, however, to
transform tort-based freedom from such emotional distress into a
constitutional right when the images are disclosed by a government
entity or official. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it
clear, in both Hustler Magazine v. Falwell" and Snyder v. Phelps,"o
that tort liability for emotional distress stemming from highly
offensive messages must be balanced against the same type of First
Amendment concerns described earlier in Part VI. This buttresses
the argument that the right articulated in Marsh should not be
absolute, but rather a qualified right bounded by competing interests.
Thus, while Favish and the Internet combined to lay the groundwork
for the Ninth Circuit's recognition of a new constitutional privacy
right, it is a right that is not as simple at it initially may seem.
308. See Armstrong v. H & C Commc'ns, Inc., 575 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (allowing a claim for emotional distress damages under the tort of outrage to
proceed after a television station aired during a news story a close-up image a six-year-old
girl's skull that was "intentionally included to create sensationalism for the report. The
close-up was gruesome and macabre, and was broadcast to thousands of viewers,
including" the immediate surviving family members of the deceased girl).
In Florida, where the Armstrong case described above occurred, the tort of outrage is
identical to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Foster v. Jackson
County, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20437 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 1994) (providing that "[u]nder
Florida law, outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress are
alternate names for the same tort").
309. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Falwell involved a public
figure's efforts to recover under the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress for the publication of an ad parody mocking the plaintiff and that was "doubtless
gross and repugnant in the eyes of most." Id. at 50. The Court held that "public figures
and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition
that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual
malice."' Id. at 56.
310. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). The Court in Snyder observed that
"[t]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment-'Congress shall make no law. ..
abridging the freedom of speech'-can serve as a defense in state tort suits, including suits
for intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. at 1215. The Court added that
whether members of the Westboro Baptist Church should be held liable in tort for
emotional distress caused by their offensive messages "turns largely on whether that
speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case."
Id.
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